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The "Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights": A Confessional Basis 
of a Universal Religion? 
It was a completely new way of thinking about the question of religion's univer­
sality, given by religious thinkers of the Enlightenment, and their attention to in­
alienable human dignity illustrates the point. These thinkers took a position in 
relation to religion and church from which they placed religion and church 
into a critical process of transformation: to enforce the universally human char­
acter of religion in its historical forms of realization. Without a doubt, it often 
happened that they understood Christianity as the absolute religion, claiming 
the highest value. They believed that religion found its fullest realization in 
Christianity. Today we look back critically at this conclusion. However, that 
should in no way imply the Enlightenment's transformation of the study of reli­
gion made no important contributions. In particular, the Human Rights dis­
course is one such contribution. This discourse has had an enormous impact 
on the self-understanding of religions. But in fact, this impact should be exam­
ined carefully in each of the different religions for one finds that it happens in 
very different and even contradictory ways. I myself am only able to discuss it 
with regard to Christianity. It is important to say right at the beginning, that 
churches and formal church theology denied much of the Enlightenment's anal­
ysis of religion and resisted acknowledgement of Human Rights for a long time. 
In regard to Christianity it will furthermore be important to pay attention to those 
transformations which triggered the Enlightenment's Human-Rights-thinking 
and which keep it dynamically going until today. These pre-conditions make sec­
ularization theory untenable and show rather a religion of humanity through the 
historical persistence and ongoing transformation of empirical religions. 
In showing that the historical movement towards a religion of humanity has 
not passed by concrete religions and churches but passes through them, I want 
to present the example of South Africa and its Human Rights discourse with ref­
erences to the continuing debate concerning the history of Apartheid. 
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A South-African Example 
Desmond Tutu's book God is not a Christian is a collection of sermons, speeches 
and statements from the former Anglican bishop of Cape Town.1 "God is clearly 
not a Christian. His concern is for all his children" insisted Tutu in a sermon in 
the church of St. Martin in The Fields near Trafalgar-Square in London, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and at the end of Apartheid in South Africa. 2 
For Tutu, there is no conflict between human rights' universal validity and 
the obligation of Christians to speak up for human rights out of their Christian 
belief. This is not because Christianity might have invented human rights and 
their worldwide distribution would be more successful under the Christian pre­
fix. Such a cultural imperialistic interpretation of the relationship between 
human rights and Christianity was far from what Tutu had in mind. It was rather 
his deep concern to win all religions for a universal enforcement of human rights 
in all his sermons and speeches, which he has delivered since the 1980's all over 
the globe. 
Tutu confesses his Christian faith in strong terms. He often underlines that it 
is essential to take his own faith seriously. But taking his own religion seriously 
does not mean to devalue other religions or to refuse the idea of a natural uni­
versal religion that is inherent in nature of human beings from the beginning. 
Religions are different, the Gods in whom they believe are different. Despite 
all that they have something in common: they reveal a transcendent element 
in humanity. 
God is not a Christian. "God is clearly not a Christian. His concern is for all 
his children." Christians do not have an exclusive relationship to God, and God 
has no exclusive relationship to Christians. He is the God of all human beings 
and they have their different relations to him. This also is important to Tutu: re­
ligions are not identical, "the" God can be understood in many different ways. As 
God is never without the individual relation, "we must hold to our particular and 
peculiar beliefs tenaciously. "3 Tutu combines these confessions to a religious in­
dividuality lead by the opinion that God generally could only be thought and be­
lieved in the different relationships people have with him. God is only God in the 
plurality of the individual religious perspectives on him. For relations among re­
ligions, Tutu stresses, this means that "we must be ready to learn from another, 
1 Desmond Mpilo Tutu, God is not a Christian, ed. John Allen (New York: Harper One, 2012). 
2 Ibid., 12. 
3 Ibid., 6. 
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not claiming that we alone possess all truth and that somehow we have a comer 
on God."4 
By acting in this way we will discover many things we have in common. 
What we actually have in common depends on what we are searching for. For 
Tutu the direction is clear. All religions he mentions have a transcendent referent 
that is compassionate and concerned; all see human beings as "creatures of this 
supreme, supra-mundane reality, with a high destiny that hopes for an everlast­
ing life lived in close association with the divine. "5 This distinction of human be­
ings as "creatures" of a higher holy reality and them being like this in "close as­
sociation with the divine" is what Tutu hopes to find as the common thing of the 
different religions. Each human being is holy, a taboo for everyone who is willing 
to hurt him. 
Tutu is delighted that he finds this holiness of human beings in the Christian 
tradition as well. "Surely, it is good to know that God (in the Christian tradition) 
created us all (not just Christians) in his image, thus investing us all with infinite 
worth. "6 It is equally important for Tutu to emphasize that just like Christianity 
other religious traditions regard human beings with holiness as well: 
Surely we can rejoice that the eternal word, the Logos of God, enlightens everyone - not just 
Christians, but everyone who comes into the world; that what we call the Spirit of God is 
not a Christian preserve, for the Spirit of God existed long before there were Christians, in­
spiring and nurturing women and men In the ways of holiness, bringing them to fruition, 
bringing them to fruition what was best In all. We do scant justice and honor to our God If 
we want, for Instance, to deny that Mahatma Gandhi was a truly great soul, a holy man who 
walks closely with God. Our God would be too small if he was not also the God of Gandhi.7 
Christianity is neither allowed to claim to be the religion that discovered holiness 
of human beings (which would be a historical mistake in any case) nor is it al­
lowed to claim that Christianity alone is the best and only condition for the en­
forcement of human's holiness. The access to the sanctuary of human beings and 
work towards the preservation of this sanctuary can be found in other religious 
convictions as well. 
To clarify that he recognizes motifs of a universal religion of humanity in his 
own Christian belief, Tutu now avoids consciously the usage of Christian and 
Uniquely biblical language while speaking about religion. This can be seen in 
Particular when he describes his participation in the Truth and Reconciliation 
-
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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Commission. The Truth and Recondliation Commission was actually founded after 
the end of Apartheid as a compromise between those who plead for a general 
amnesty and those who advocated a process, similar to the Nuremburg trials, 
in which the offenders should be brought before court to get their just punish­
ment. In contrast to this, Tutu recommended a concept not of retributive but 
of restorative justice. This was also the proposal which the parliament, after de­
tailed consultations between the old and the new government, agreed on. The 
victims should have the opportunity to tell their stories and the offenders should 
have the possibility to admit their guilt. This path of restorative justice symbol­
ized and expressed Tutu's Christian belief in reconciliation. In the divine justifi­
cation of the sinner and the human force to reconciliation that results out of the 
belief in God's righteousness, he saw a decisive contribution of the Christian re­
ligion to South Africa's democratic reconstruction. Nevertheless, Tutu avoids the 
usage of language that is influenced by Christian belief. He often speaks about 
an outer perspective and about the Christian belief as one religious worldview 
among others. 
It is obvious that Tutu tries to point out that religion-and with this the re­
lation between a human to something transcendent-are expressed in various 
ways within different religions. Each religion has its own specific way to express 
this relation. Religions even respond to secular people and people who have no 
specific relation to any religion at all. 
Religion is something that belongs to the human being. This can be seen in 
the way that religion resists all determining associations of individual human be­
ings with their particular circumstances. Religion provocatively insists that one 
has dignity simply because one is a human being, regardless of one's character­
istics or affiliations, independent from one's deeds or misdeeds. Religion shifts 
one's being into an unconditioned horizon. One's right to exist derives from con­
ditions that are independent of oneself. A human being is not able to and does 
not have to earn this right. One's right to exist is derived from something that is 
beyond oneself, it derives from God. In Christian discourse this means that a per­
son is God's creature, his beloved child, and a justified sinner. But Tutu only 
speaks rarely and cautiously in this biblical language. Tutu counts on a transver­
sal religious reason to which all humans with good will are responding. This 
transversal religious reason is the truly religious matter in all religions: that is, 
religion sees the individual human being from the perspective of a self-tran­
scended humanity founded in the Unconditioned. Religion is a transcendent de­
termination of human existence that, then in a twist, revokes itself and gives hu­
manity back to itself. 
Tutu used such common religious language, compelling even for secular 
people, in referring to the "essential humanity of the perpetrator of even the 
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most gruesome atrocity"8 in his plead for a path of reconciliation. He could have 
spoken about the public-political force of Christian belief in reconciliation. But 
instead he makes recourse to "essential humanity" also that of "the perpetrator". 
He mentions the fact that no one could deny the human dignity of a person, 
however heinous his deed. This is a reformulation of a religious interpretation 
of human rights discourse from Tutu's Christian orientation. Tutu emphasizes 
that the evidences of what religion generally contributes to human life and soci­
ety show religion indispensable in the realization of humanity. 
In this way the path of restorative justice should become passable for people 
who come from other non-Christian, religious worldviews too. Tutu specifically 
points towards the African worldview of the 'Ubuntu'. Ubuntu is a Xhosa-word 
that expresses the essential individual's affiliation to a community. Ubuntu, as 
well, stands for the transcending of each individual human being in a larger, in­
finite reaching entirety. For the community of Ubuntu that qualifies the being of 
an individual is not only the visible tribal community but also the chain that 
links to the ancestors. The African worldview of Ubuntu together with the idea 
that human beings are made in God's image found in the Hebrew Bible and 
the Christian understanding of the unconditioned justification of the sinner alto­
gether represent for Tutu an integral and universal religion of human rights. At 
the same time it is important for him to point out that these three ideas are, on 
the one hand, indispensable elements in the construction of this universal reli­
gion of human rights while, on the other hand, that religion cannot be identified 
with them.9 
Tutu is not interested in a historic independence of different religious tradi­
tions and worldviews. He is rather interested in "the religion" as the plurality of 
religions, that is in an aspect that is undeniable in human beings. "Don't we 
have to be reminded too that the faith to which we belong is far more often a 
matter of the accidents of history and geography than personal choice?"10 This 
is an allusion to Rousseau, who also had the opinion that the question to 
which religion we belong is a question of geography. But it is also a suggestion 
that religious belief belongs to the conditio humana. Tutu then advances ideas of 
natural law and natural religion by referring to Paul's argument of a natural the­
ology, and to Kant and the Enlightenment. 
Everyone of God's human creatures has the capacity to know something about God from 
the evidence God leaves In his handiworks (Romans 1:18-20); this Is the basis for natural 
-
8 Ibid., 42. 
9 Ibid., 21-24. 
10 Ibid., 16. 
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theology and natural law. Immanuel Kant spoke about categorical imperative. All human 
creatures have a sense that some things ought to be done just as others not to be done. 
This is a universal phenomenon - what varies is the content of natural law. [ ... ] In his speech 
before the Areopagus, Paul speaks about how God created all human beings from one stock 
and given everyone the urge, the hunger, for divine things so that all will seek after God and 
perhaps find him, adding that God is not far from us since all (not just Christians) live and 
move and have their being in him (Act. 17: 22-31). Talking to pagans, Paul declares that all 
are God's offspring.11 
The "universal phenomenon" is the phenomenon of a religious consciousness 
that was given initially to the human being. This religious consciousness be­
comes concrete in an openness to transcendence: searching for and questioning 
something that is beyond oneself. The particular religions build themselves up 
on this natural religion. But they also presuppose this natural religion as the uni­
versal resonance chamber that outlives their own history. Natural religion exists 
in the particular religions. But not exclusively; pointing out this fact is very im­
portant for me. There is one universal religion in all concrete religions that acts 
through and beyond them, a religion which we should by all means call: the re­
ligion of human rights. 
Although Tutu has not articulated it in such an explicit way, it is in my opin­
ion implied by his argumentation in the way he describes the particular, concrete 
religions-and not only Christianity-by interrogating their contribution to the 
enforcement of human rights. Doing this he tries to see the best in each of 
them as something that serves the humanity of human beings. 
We must not make the mistake of judging other faiths by their least attractive features and 
adherents: It is possible to demolish the case for Christianity by, for instance, quoting the 
Crusades, or the atrocities of the Holocaust, or the excess of apartheid. But we know that 
that would be unfair in the extreme, since we claim them to be aberrations, distortions and 
deviations. What about Francis of Assisi, Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer, and all the won­
derful and beautiful people and things that belong to Christianity? We should want to deal 
with other faiths and their best and highest, as they define themselves, and not shoot down 
the caricatures that we want to put up.u 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Ibid., 16. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as a confessional basis of a universal religion 
Human rights were initially formulated in the political revolutions of the 18th cen­
tury. They can be traced back to the American Declaration of Independence as 
well as to the French Revolution. Finally they found their approval under inter­
national law in the UN-Charter with The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Let us take a brief look at the three preambles of those three declarations of 
human rights: in each three of them there is no reference to a particular, concrete 
religion, not even to Christianity. There can be no talk of any explicit theological 
basis of human rights. Nevertheless one has to admit that religion is a topic in 
those declarations. One even can speak decidedly of a confessional basis, that 
explicitly characterizes the American and French Declaration of Human Rights 
and that religious implication was maintained in the UN-Charter of 1948. The 
American Declaration of Independence from 1776 insists that "all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights" 
and the French National Assembly explicitly claims that it "recognizes and de­
clares" human- and civil rights "in the presence and under the auspices of the 
Supreme Being." In The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 the ex­
plicit reference to God is absent. That the human being has inalienable rights is 
no longer directly connected to the authority and will of a God anymore. Instead 
of this there is talk about an "inherent dignity" which belongs to every human 
being. Because it belongs to "all members of the human family", all of them 
have "equal and inalienable rights"u. It is obvious that talk of the "inherent dig­
nity", which first can be found in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 
1948, is functionally equivalent with the reference to God from the Declaration of 
Human Rights of the 18th century.14 
That nations with different cultural and religious backgrounds would sign 
the Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 makes the omission of the reference 
to God more evident. But already the American and French human rights decla­
ration claim a universal approach. Both of them combined this universal ap­
proach with a confessional base: Because it is God who makes all human beings, 
apart from what differentiates them, as beings standing under God, the Supreme 
Being and their Creator, human beings should have equal rights. This religious -
13 Cf. http://www.ohchr.o rg/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (13.02.2013). 
14 Cf. The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1TT6: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/char 
ters/declaration_transcript.html; The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 
AUgust, 1789: http://www.hlstoryguide.org/lntellect/declaration.html (13.02.2013). 
46 - Wilhelm Griib 
meaning also becomes obvious in talk of "inherent dignity". The language of in­
herent dignity places human rights under conditions that are ineluctably given to 
every human being and which cannot be the subject of negotiation in the specif­
ic communities to which human beings belong. Human dignity belongs to every 
human being in an unconditioned way. This is precisely what it means to see 
someone through the eyes of faith. At the end of the 18th century this faith 
could be easily pronounced as faith in God, the Creator. In the UN-Charter the 
confessional foundation of the universal approach of human rights had to 
change, even though only semantically. Only with such a change it was possible 
for so many different cultural and religious traditions to accept and adopt the 
Declaration. 
This cultural transformation and adaption is in fact what happened at the 
beginning and merged in the process of placing the Declaration of Human Rights 
in different cultural and religious traditions. The process is not at all completed 
and is, with regard to religion, often controversially discussed because the role of 
religion in human rights discourse often becomes closely related to specific reli­
gions. And then one often sees oneself, of course, quickly involved in a very am­
bivalent history. One has to confess that Christian churches accepted the idea of 
human rights quite late and even today often accused of not advocating for 
human rights very strongly. Religions have their own legal orders that can 
lead to conflicts with national law and even with human rights, especially in 
cases where human rights have entered into state legal orders. But that religion 
is necessary for the realization of humanity, that religion constitutively belongs 
to human being: this is something that was registered in the declarations of 
human rights from their beginning and finally makes The Declaration of 
Human Rights from 1948 the confessional base of a universal religion. 
Although there were already attempts during the French Revolution to found 
a practice of a new humanitarian Christianity on the basis of the Declaration of 
Independence, contrary to this universal approach there is the approach of par­
ticularization of the general in specific religions, churches, and denominations. 
Consider the theophilanthropists, a humanistic religious orientation that held 
their services from 1794 to 1810 in France. Often these services took place in cath­
olic churches which partly were used for theophilanthropic and partly for cath­
olic services. One of these churches was Saint-Merri in the center of Paris. The 
services of the theophilanthropists were well attended but then became prohib­
ited by Napoleon. 
In our days it is very rarely the case that religions, let alone states and their 
legal apparatuses, can prohibit such free human-rights-based religious organiza­
tion or even desire to. In contrast we are seeing the universal norms of human 
rights appear in traditional religious forms and cultures all over the world. How-
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ever, the negotiation of a universal religion of humanity in particularized forms 
of concrete religious traditions proves challenging. Wherever the idea of human 
rights enters, it changes the constituted religions. And more as that happens: The 
idea of human rights even can become a religious movement or organization. It 
articulates itself as it is in reality: a belief in the human being, in the transcen­
dent divine determination of the human, in an inventive creativity and hence in 
man's inviolable dignity. 
How traditional religious cultures transformed under the impact of the 
human rights campaign can very well be seen in the fact that the theology of 
the second part of the 20th century understood human dignity as an expression, 
if not almost as a consequence, of man's likeness of God. This shows how, for 
theology, the human-religious understanding of human-dignity was enriched 
by the religion of human rights. 
Like all other particular human living conditions, the particular, concrete re­
ligions by no means become unimportant in the universal approach of human 
rights. The concrete religions face the challenge and opportunity of sharpening 
their particularity in a way that connects to a common religious dimension. 
This can take place through re-examination of religious traditions' practices 
and self-understandings. I am talking about a synchronization of people's con­
crete religious practices with humanity's actual, existential condition. The reli­
gions ought to further the universal humanity-religion of human rights by 
means of their historical, ritual and ideological resources. People long to feel 
at home in the religion into which they are born and grow in the way that 
human beings always already feel at home in the universal transcendence of 
their humanity. 
The world is growing more and more together. We call this phenomenon 
globalization. Globalization is driven by information technologies and economy 
With high speed. But more than a billion people do not benefit from this techno­
logical and economical globalization. They do not have access to internet. They 
do not get a chance to participate in the wealth of their countries and regions. 
Their human rights to life, freedom, self-development and security are refused. 
Particular differences in sex and race, skin-color and language, religion and na­
tion place hard limits on the global realization of human rights. Especially the 
concrete religions are strict border guards against the enforcement of equal 
rights to freedom, justice and security for all human beings. They often prevent 
that people "act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. "is In South Af-
-
15 UN-Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1. 
Cf. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf. (13.02.2013). 
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rica, for example, there is no other hour during the week in which the racial seg­
regation can be felt in such a strong way as each Sunday morning between nine 
and eleven o'clock, while the white, the black, the colored or the Indian com­
munity hold their services, each alone, apart from the others. 
On the way to an universal religion 
of human rights 
The Declaration of Human Rights did not emerge from any concrete religion, not 
even from Christianity and its church. Its starting point was the experience of 
pain and harm, the experience of brutal non-recognition, "barbarous acts"16, 
as it is called in the UN-Charter's preamble from 1948. The screams of those de­
prived of their right to live by the totalitarian regimes of National Socialism and 
Stalinism, of those tormented, tortured, and killed because of racial, national, 
political or religious reasons or because of their sexuality, can still be heard in 
the declaration. Until today, it is the experience of violations of human rights 
that provide the appeal to keep and enforce them. Yet, this is only possible be­
cause they have a global status as a universal valid norm under international law 
and were turned into enforceable rights in the constitutions of many countries. If 
a blatant violation becomes public anywhere in the world, one will immediately 
appeal to human rights. Recent examples include the brutal rape and murder of 
young Indian women and the restrictions of same-sex relationships in Russia, to 
name only two. Such violations clearly point out that human rights must prevail 
upon (and at times be protected from) cultural traditions and the symbolic sys­
tems of religions-both of which are often associated with the political powers 
that use them for its needs. 
For this reason the defense and enforcement of human rights is often sus­
pected of acting in a cultural-imperialistic way. When, in addition, wars are de­
clared under the pretext that they have an interest in supporting human rights, 
although in reality the main interest is rights to oil production, these suspicions 
are clearly supported. Hence, human rights are often understood as a continua­
tion of western colonialism. Nevertheless, it must be said that only through an 
intervention, legitimated by international law, in the affairs of a state that either 
threats the security of its citizens or is not able to ensure it, it is possible to pre­
vent further violations (as for example currently in Mali). 
16 UN-Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
Cf. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (13.02. 2013). 
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The question is whether international interventions for the enforcement of 
human rights, especially if they induce a military conflict that creates additional 
more harm, have cultural-imperialistic features, even if the intention was good. 
This question actually opens up a quite difficult issue in the end. Because the 
intention behind these interventions to enforce the human rights is their claim 
of a universal normativity and thus finally also of a universal religion of the 
human. The idea of human rights is not something that someone invented at 
his work desk. They exist in a concrete manner in the heads and hearts of numer­
ous people, who stand up for them as they constitute their value orientation and 
religious belief. 
Thus, it must be generally accepted that on the one hand the human rights 
require self-determined values and on the other they support certain values that 
are not equally appreciated and practiced in all cultures and religions around 
the world. Next to this universal religion of human rights cultural and also reli­
gious differences will indeed continue to exist. Religious ties and belongings 
supply these values with a strong potential of motivation for daily living. All re­
ligious cultures are different in what they consider law and rights and in how 
they appreciate individual choice with regard to sexual orientation and the 
choice of partnership, profession and residence. You can find many different cul­
tural opinions about the relation between the individual and community, about 
the idea of physical integrity, about who takes precedence in the relation of in­
dividual and community and hierarchy of individual and community (e. g. fam­
ily, clan, and nation). They might all be different but at the same time, they all 
have a religious foundation. Likewise, you will find different but always reli­
giously founded opinions about the idea of equality of men and women, 
about religious tolerance or about the estimation of democratic participation. 
The UN-Commission already knew that there is a high tension between a 
Universal normativity of human rights and the pluralism of all the different reli­
gious cultures in the constituting phase of The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In his book on human right's genealogy Hans Joas offers a good insight 
into the work of the UN-commission, in which delegates from 18 nations 
Participated.17 He especially points to two particular delegates namely Charles 
Malik, the Lebanese representative, and Peng-Chun Chang, the Chinese represen­
tative. Charles Malik, speaker for the Arabian world, was an orthodox Christian 
Whereas, according to Joas, Pen-Chun Chang often referred to his Confucian 
-
17 Hans Joas, Die Salcralltllt der Person: Eine neue Genealogie der Menschenrechte (Berlin: Suhr-
kamp, 2011), 251-281, 273 f. English translation: The Sacredness of the Person. A New Genealogy 
of Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013). 
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background during the drafting process of the Declaration. Yet Pen-Chun Chang 
was also the person who warned on the one hand against a foundation for the 
human rights that is limited to reason and on the other against a special empha­
sis of one single religious tradition. He was interested in a synthesis of all the 
different religious traditions of vindication into one common value system. 
This is consistent with the fact that there is no reference to a universal ratio of 
humans but to a universal "faith"18 in a human religious conviction in the pre­
amble of the documents of the constitution: "the faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person. "19 It proclaims the 
human rights movement as a religious movement, as a movement that is 
based on a faith, faith in the possibility of creating conditions around the 
world that gives every human being access to certain rights, as Hanna Arendt in­
terpreted The Declaration of Human Rights' fundamental claim. 
The faith that is apparent in the United Nation's founding documents as well 
as in their declaration of human rights was a result of the work of people coming 
from different cultures, religions and parts of the world. What becomes evident is 
that this faith never would have gained such popularity if it was not to a large 
extent compatible with the concrete, positive religious faith that is practiced in 
the different religions and cultures in so many different ways. Still, what remains 
important is the question who will take charge when the concrete religions and 
cultural traditions merge to one universal religion of human rights. Is it the nor­
mative universality of human rights with its attempt to find recognition as offi­
cial rights? Or will it be the particular religious traditions who only want to as­
sign human rights to own fellow believers as they think them to be maintained 
according to their own norms of faith this way?20 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt, that the validity of universal human rights has to be transmit­
ted in accordance with the self-understanding of particular and regional reli-
18 UN-Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
19 UN-Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
20 The person, who was responsible for the drafting of the United-Nations Charter's preamble, 
was Jan Smuts. He wrote the impressive words of "the faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person" that I just quoted (Preamble, UN-Declaration of Human 
Rights). Smuts was head of the South-African government several times in the 1930s and the 
early 1940s although he was not responsible directly for the policy of racial Apartheid, enacted 
in 1948, the same year The Declaration of Human Rights was enacted. 
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gious cultures. To a certain extent, human rights have to incarnate in the minds 
and hearts of people during their acquisition process in the different cultures 
and religions. Therefore, one talks about a necessary cultural synthesis and 
value generalization in human rights discourse. But in this process of synthesis 
and generalization it has to be ensured that human rights remain intact and in­
violable and that states and societies follow their requirements. Cultural synthe­
sis and value generalization will only be of any help if they support the enforce­
ment of human religion within historical religions, if the universal religion of 
human rights finds recognition in the particular religions and in the cultures 
that are merged with them. This will have practical consequences for religious 
as well as for judicial practice in the countries in which human rights claim val­
idity. 
First of all this means that religious cultures have to legitimize themselves to 
human rights and not vice versa. Religions, their practices and legal interpreta­
tions have to prove themselves to be compatible with human rights. Secondly, 
this means that one has to insist on the validity of human rights, in particular 
on the right to self-determination, even if they are opposed to religious ideas 
of morality. When the human right for self-determination, for justice and security 
is valid in a state, these rights have to be valid for all people, independently from 
their religious denomination or ethnicity, even if this right might contradict the 
norms of a religious community, for instance freedom of sexual orientation. 
Therefore, the universal religion of human rights can hardly be enforced 
without conflicts with religious and political powers. Hence this religion will 
be all the more vigorous the more states implement human rights into their con­
stitutions and the more people are committed to human rights. People might 
come from concrete religions, they might stay in contact with them or just 
pass them by, but they are all connected in a worldwide community with the 
same spirit of universal religion of human rights. But it is also clear that faith 
in the holiness of every human being, confessed by the universal religion of 
human rights, will gradually change the religions. It is a faith in the holiness 
of the human being-not a human being formed and acting in thus and such 
a way, but of the human being just the way it already exists. This faith alone 
will change the world. It changes the world through the way that love, mercy 
and forgiveness are practiced, that there will be help where people are victimized 
by violence and state terror, where hungry people suffer from starvation and 
have to escape from their home countries. 
Indeed, a lot of things need to be done in this line. Without the implemen­
tation of human rights into the constitutions of states and the enforcement of 
their validity under international law, much less would have been achieved to• 
Wards a more human world. Yet, all this effort is based on the faith in the holi-
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ness of the human being. It is this faith, in the end, that encourages people to 
fight for adherence to and enforcement of human rights, whether they are mem­
bers of a religious community or not. 
However, it should be highlighted that people with religious background, 
just like Desmond Tutu, do fight for human rights worldwide, that religious 
moral values lead to an active cooperation in NGO's and that churches and par­
ishes offer room and financial help to human right groups. 
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